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William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth
Century America, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Pp.
x + 396. $55.00 cloth (ISBN 0-8078-2282-2), $19.95 paper (ISBN 0-80784611-2).
William J. Novak has written a book at once ambitious and audacious that pro
poses a counterrevolution of sorts in our understanding of American law from the
aftennath of the Revolution to the aftermath of the Civil War. His theory is dis 
arming ly simp le: American society during this period was highly reg ulated by
public and private law, and was not a laissez-faire socie ty free from constraints on
individual activity.
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In seeking to correct the conventional interpretations about the organization,
structure, and operation of law in American life, Novak counters four persistent
"myths" about nineteenth-century America: statelessness, liberal individualism, the
great transformation, and American exceptionalism. In their place, Novak substi
tutes the concept of a "well-regulated society," stressing governance and police.
Governance is based on traditions and principles honed by ideas organized around
notions of public spirit, local self-government, civil liberty (a liberty never abso
lute), and law (particularly, a common law). Novak argues that there is an addi
tional "myth of American liberty" that needs to be reexamined. He claims that "the
storied history of liberty in the United States, with its vaunted rhetoric of unprec
edented rights of property, contract, mobility, privacy, and bodily integrity, was built
directly upon a strong and consistent willingness to employ the full, c9ercive, and
regulatory powers of law and government. The public conditions of private free
dom remain the great problem of American governmental and legal history" ( 17).
The cornerstones of the limitations of freedom are found in an opening chapter
on "the common law vision of a well-regulated society." Novak rejects concepts
of law rooted in liberal constitutional ism's insistence on protecting individual au
tonomy from state activity and legal instrumentalism's assertion of a reflexive and
functional, if not reductionist, legal system. Instead, Novak posits a common law
derived from consent, history, experience, accommodation, and public spirit, and
located in a pragmatic methodology focusing on man's experience as a social be
ing in a society founded on relative and relational rights. As a result, the common
law's emphasis was on "an overall concern with the people's welfare obtainable
within a well-regulated society" (26). In fact, the commitment to this vision can
be measured by the invocation of two familiar common law maxims crucial to the
implementation of social order: salus populi suprema lex est (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law), and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own
so as not to injure another). Both maxims informed public and private nuisance
law. According to Novak, "the end of this rule of common law and the crowning
achievement of this whole body of thought was good governance in a w'ell-regu
lated society: laws were tools of regulation; regulation was the condition for so
cial order and the pursuit of the people's welfare; social order and the people's
welfare were the primary objects of governance" (42).
In order to illustrate the details of this well-regulated society, Novak provides
examples in five chapters, each representing a separate category of public limita
tions of private activity: public safety (fire and gunpowder regulations); public
economy (product licensing, the creation and maintenance of public, urban mar
ketplace sites, and corporations-Richard Posner and Richard Epstein might want
to read this chapter, if not the book); public ways (roadway, riverway, and port
regulations); public morality (disorderly houses, bawdy houses, and various types
of liquor regulations); and public health (medical police, quarantines, and offen
sive or noxious trades). In each of the chapters the lesson is clear: absolute private
rights of property or contract gave way to the well-being of the community. The
very notion of absolute private rights indeed may be something of a misnomer, since
Novak seems to suggest that the starting point for analysis of law and society is
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the assumption that the public welfare is foremost and that individual rights are
derivative and must be accommodated to an overarching public interest. "The first
historical lesson to be drawn from the well-regulated society," writes Novak, "con
cerns the overwhelming presence of the state and regulation in nineteenth-centu
ry American life .... All private interests and rights were subordinate to ... pub
lic objectives" (235-36).
Novak provides abundant evidence for his claim that, through ordinances, mu
nicipal regulations, statutes, and common law decisions, public officials-includ
ing judges-carved out realms of public activity that most citizens sanctioned in
some way, though in the private law setting at least one of the parties was chal
lenging the norm. And some regulations provide examples of micro-management:
the 1810 statute regulating rates on the New York City-Nassau Island ferry pro
vided the same charge for carrying mahogany bedsteads, tea or card tables, or
dogs-four times the charge for carrying lambs, muskets, or empty milk kettles.
Novak unmasks the intrusiveness of the premodern polity into many corners of
American life. Novak's point, of course, is that nineteenth-century Americans did
not experience this regulation as intrusive at all, nor did they merely tolerate it,
rather they encouraged and accepted it as part of their everyday existence. The
historical question then is what do we make of this "regulation"?
A clue may reside in the historiography that dominates Novak's book, Novak
primarily relies on, though to varying degrees, the historical relationship of law and
society suggested by Morton Keller's regulatory studies and by the work of Dirk
Hartog and Chris Tomlins. Events and ideas about governance, police, and law are
socially constructed (the intellectual debt to Foucault is acknowledged as well)
through a complex matrix that defies ready characterization, but that once might have
been ascribed to economic determinism or functionalism. Firmly, though not uni
formly rejected (you have to read the footnotes carefully), are the 4-H club (Hartz,
Horwitz, Hovenkamp, and Hurst), presumably because they suffer from the sin of
having espoused at various times, though with different conclusions, ideas that
placed the monolith of individualism as the centerpiece of American legal histori
ography. Individualism will not do, whether it is linked causally to industrialism,
materialism, or entrepreneurship. Rather, according to Novak, a closer look reveals
a society in balance-with a commonly held belief that it was appropriate for indi
viduals to accept restraints on their freedom for the purpose of enhancing the bet
ter good. Nineteenth-century America was an organically united society agreeing
on certain principles, among them the limitation in certain circumstances of the
social and economic expression of freedom. Duties and responsibilities were shared,
so that communities, and, ultimately, individuals could prosper.
This then is a modem, historiographical version of community, shorn of eco
nomically determined constraints. In an earlier generation, this book might have
found its origins in neo-Marxist thought where we could have debated whether or
not Novak's evidence means that individual rights did not have a central role to
play in American society, and that American society, therefore, was grounded in
community, or instead, that a modem emphasis on individual rights shows an ille
gitimate transformation from a communitarian ethic. What Novak does directly,
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however, is challenge the historically drawn image of unrestrained, self-interest
ed activity as the norm with interest, factions, or groups competing for resources
(particularly economic activity in the marketplace-there is no such thing as a
"free" market, all markets are regulated in some fashion). Instead, he suggests that
the appropriate method of interpretation should take into account the relationships
between individuals (with duties to one another) and society (with duties enforced
through regulated activities). The goal is to transcend traditional dichotomies of
interpretation like private/public, individual/state, individual/community, and re
duce them to the category of historical anachronism, an old way of thinking about
the world.
As in all counterrevolutions, there are certain untidy corners. In striving to re
dress a perceived imbalance in one direction toward individualism, Novak may have
swung the pendulum too far back in the direction of regulation. One narrative may
have simply replaced another, though the more accurate account may lie somewhere
in between. And there may be competing definitions of individual liberty at stake.
One person's regulation may be another person's freedom. For example, when an
individual's property is altered under state authority to make a better roadway, it
may be an uncompensated regulation of that owner's interest. But presumably the
result of the public improvement is to encourage or enhance another person's ability
to exercise their liberty perhaps by getting to market to buy and sell or engage in
some other activity.
·
By focusing on a "well-regulated society," Novak risks emphasizing consensus
over conflict and therefore deemphasizing the plight of certain disadvantaged and
excluded groups in nineteenth-century America. For instance, Gordon Wood's most
recent work on the radicalism of the American Revolution is missing from this
book. Because Wood stressed the increasingly uncomfortable match between rev
olutionary rhetoric and t~e legacy of dependent social relations, it would have been
nice to know how the notion of regulated private conduct fits with movements to
free from restraints individuals embedded in the status relations of husband/wife,
parent/child, master/servant, town/pauper, landlord/tenant, or creditor/debtor. It is
to Novak's credit that he seems aware of the consensus problem, as well as the
paradox of simultaneously resisting being driven back in time looking for the roots
of his paradigm (for instance, the rich, ambiguous seventeenth-century Puritan
morality tale of Robert Keanye, analyzed at different times by Perry Miller, Bai
lyn, and Innes), and forward in time (addressed in a brief, concluding chapter) to
the presentist concerns of a twentieth-century world of a centralized, interventionist,
bureaucratic state poised in an uneasy tension with a regime of individual rights
and entitlements.
The modern state is now omnipresent: are we to wax nostalgic for a simpler,
locally grounded model of nonthreatening, regulatory equipoise, or are we to ac
cept some modern notion of regulation secure in the knowledge that it is as cen
tral to the American experience as, say, republican, civic virtue? We just need to
guard against its excesses, like any other threat to social order, but we ought to be
reminded that some version of regulation has always been with us. Does regula
tion, therefore, not only heighten consensus but also lead to emphasizing the con-
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tinuity between the American past and present? Along these lines, the major un
answered question in Novak's book is how we, as a society or through our public
entities, have gone about the process of determi ning just exactly what the public
good is. How do we identify the source of the public good in rationalizing or de
fending private or public activity? At various times, for instance, legal regimes have
sanctioned slavery, or segregation, presumably because of some concept of the
"public good." How did democracies make those decisions?
It is a tribute to Novak's considerable accomplishme nt that he stimulates you
to think and ask questions, to challenge old conventions about the past, and to
reopen debates in order to reexamine complacent auicudes. Sophisticated and pro
vocative, well-written, well-argued, and exhaustively researched, William Novak
has provided an important, useful, and controversial attempt to reorient our under
standing of nineteenth-century American legal history.

Alfred S. Konefsky
SUNY-Buffalo Law School

